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OLD LEGACIES AND NEW PARADIGMS: CONFUSING
"RESEARCH" AND "TREATMENT" AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENT HEALTH THREATS
GAIL H. JAVITT, J.D., M.P.H.*
I. INTRODUCTION
During Operation Desert Storm, as the 1991 Gulf War campaign is known,
United States military leaders feared that Saddam Hussein would unleash
biological or chemical agents against United States troops. Saddam was known to
have used chemical agents against his own population, and available intelligence
suggested he also might have biological weapons capabilities.2 Two types of
threats in particular were identified: (1) biological agents, including anthrax and
botulinum toxin; and (2) chemical nerve agents, such as sarin, soman, tabun, and
VX.3
To protect troops against these threats, the military sought to administer
two agents that it believed constituted "the best preventive or therapeutic
treatment" available. 4 These were the drug pyridostigmine bromide (PB), and the
botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine.5 However, at the time neither of these agents was
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), at least for the uses under
consideration by the Department of Defense (DOD). 6 PB is approved by FDA for
treatment of myasthenia gravis (a neuromuscular transmission disorder) and for
* Adjunct Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Greenwall Fellow in Bioethics and Health
Policy (2000-2002), Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities. J.D., Harvard Law School, M.P.H.,
Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. This paper has its origins in work supported by
the RAND Corporation's Center for Domestic and International Health Security.
1. RICHARD A. RETTIG, MILITARY USE OF DRUGS NOT YET APPROVED BY THE FDA FOR
CW/BW DEFENSE: LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR xi, 2 (1999).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,814 (Dec. 21,
1990).
5. See COMMITTEE ON HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOC. WITH EXPOSURES DURING THE GULF WAR,
INST. OF MED., GULF WAR AND HEALTH: DEPLETED URANIUM, PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, SARIN,
VACCINES 34 (Carolyn E. Fulco et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter GULF WAR & HEALTH] (noting that
troops were given PB and BT when they arrived in the Persian Gulf), www.nap.edu/openbook/
030907178X/html/R1.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
6. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Pyridostigmine Bromide as Pretreatment Against Nerve
Gas (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00870.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2005); RETTIG, supra note I.
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use in reversing some effects of certain anesthetics. 7 In this instance, however,
DOD sought to use it as a pre-treatment to mitigate the effects of nerve agent
exposure.8 DOD had filed an "investigational new drug" (IND) application with
FDA for this use of PB in 1984, but the IND was still pending. 9 Similarly, BT,
which had been used for over a decade by individuals in certain agricultural
occupations at risk for botulism, was, as a formal matter, the subject of an IND
held by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). l °
Perhaps foreseeing that administering products labeled investigational to
troops could be controversial, DOD first sought authority from FDA to administer
these products to troops.'" DOD's Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs submitted
a letter to FDA in which the agency requested the authority to administer IND
products to troops. 12 Further, DOD requested that FDA provide a mechanism to
7. See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, MESTINON PRODUCT
INFORMATION (1995), http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2001/11665s151bl.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
8. GULF WAR & HEALTH, supra note 5, at 207.
9. RONALD E. CLAWSON, CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL MEDICAL SYSTEMS (CBMS),
PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE: How WE GOT HERE AND WHAT'S NEXT AFTER LICENSURE OR AND YOU
THOUGHT YOU WERE DONE WITH PB (2003), https://mrmc.detrick.army.mil/docs/rcq/HSRRBOffSite
03/Pyridostigmine%20Bromide%2ORon%20Clawson.ppt (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
10. Researchers Search for Answers About Possible Adverse Effects of Vaccinations, Including
Anthrax and Botulinum, GULF WAR REV. (Veteran's Admin.) (photo. reprint) (May, 2001), available at
http://wwwl.va.gov/gulfwar/docs/GRiskFactor7.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
11. DOD arguably could have taken the position that FDA permission was not required for the
administration of unapproved products for therapeutic purposes under conditions of imminent combat.
While the two agencies operated under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning clinical
testing of investigational products by the military, Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Defense and the Food and Drug Administration, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,472, 33,473 (Sept. 3,
1987), DOD could have argued it was not applicable in this situation. DOD could have, if challenged,
asserted that distribution of drugs under these circumstances does not constitute distribution in
"interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Furthermore, a court
might have determined that the decision to administer products considered investigational by FDA for
the purpose of force protection was within the sole discretion of the military and therefore
nonjusticiable. See Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'don other grounds 938
F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting service member's challenge to Interim Rule 50.23(d) on the basis
that the military's decision to administer unapproved drugs to troops was "precisely the type of military
decision that courts have refused to second-guess").
12. Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics, 55 Fed. Reg. at 52,814. The letter stated,
in part:
These are not exotic new drugs; these drugs have well-established uses (although in
contexts somewhat different from our requirements) and are believed by medical
personnel in both DoD and FDA to be safe. For example, one product consists of a very
commonly used drug packaged in a special intramuscular injector to make it readily
useable by soldiers on the battlefield. Another example involves a vaccine long recognized
by the Centers for Disease Control as the primary preventive treatment available for a
particular disease, but the relative infrequency of its use has slowed the accumulation of
sufficient immunogenicity data to yet support full licensing of the product. Still another
example involves a drug in common use at a particular dosage level, but to preserve
alertness of the soldiers, we prefer a lower-dosage tablet, which is not an FDA approved
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waive the requirement of informed consent "in cases in which it is established that
military combat exigencies make that necessary. ' 3 DOD argued that its purpose
in administering the products was to protect troops against the chemical and
biological threats they could potentially encounter.'4  Because of this therapeutic
purpose, DOD concluded that their use did not constitute "research involving a
human being as an experimental subject" within the meaning of DOD regulations
governing human subjects research,15 and consent was therefore not required.
product. FDA personnel have been extremely cooperative and supportive in reviewing our
proposed protocols for these products, quickly providing favorable responses to all of our
submissions to date.
Id.
13. Id. at 52,815. The letter further articulated the rationale justifying DOD's request:
FDA assistance is also needed on the issue of informed consent. Under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the general rule is that, regardless of the character of the
medical evidence, any use of an IND, whether primarily for investigational purposes or
primarily for treatment purposes, must be preceded by obtaining informed consent from
the patient. The statute authorizes exceptions, however, when the medical professionals
administering the product "deem it not feasible" to obtain informed consent.
Our planning for Desert Shield contingencies has convinced us that another
circumstance should be recognized in the FDA regulation in which it would be consistent
with the statute and ethically appropriate for medical professionals to "deem it not
feasible" to obtain informed consent of the patient-that circumstance being the existence
of military combat exigencies, coupled with a determination that the use of the product is
in the best interest of the individual. By the term "military combat exigencies", we mean
military combat (actual or threatened) circumstances in which the health of the individual,
the safety of other personnel and the accomplishment of the military mission require that a
particular treatment be provided to a specified group of military personnel, without regard
to what might be any individual's personal preference for no treatment or for some
alternative treatment.
Id. at 52,814-15.
14. See id. at 52,815.
15. 10 U.S.C.A. § 980 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004). At the time of the Gulf War, DOD's governing
statute, 10 U.S.C. § 980, provided that funds appropriated to the Department of Defense could not be
used for research involving a human being as an experimental subject unless the informed consent of
the subject was obtained in advance, or, "in the case of research intended to be beneficial to the
subject," the "informed consent of the subject or a legal representative of the subject" was obtained in
advance. Id. When faced with the issue of administering IND drugs to military personnel, Robert
Gilliat, the Assistant General Counsel of DOD, concluded in a memorandum that "the proposed uses of
the drugs in question are, in fact, primarily treatment uses, not uses primarily for investigational or
research purposes." RETTIG, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Memorandum from Robert L. Gilliat,
Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), "Applicability of Human Subject
Research Restrictions to Potential Medical Treatments in Connection with Operation Desert Shield,"
(Sept. 14, 1990). Additionally, the memorandum stated:
In connection with the potential need in Operation Desert Shield for certain treatment uses
of the several drugs classified as 1NDs, it is clear that very unusual circumstances are
present. The drugs have all progressed through FDA's IND process sufficiently to
establish a high level of confidence on the part of the DOD medical community; the
potential effects of the chemical and biological weapons widely reported as available to
the Iraqi military are deadly; and the proposed uses, if approved by the FDA, will reflect
the best scientific and medical judgment of the U.S. Government.
Id. In 2001, Congress amended 10 U.S.C. § 980 to include a new subsection (b), which provides:
[VOL. 8:1:38
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Unlike the case with civilians, the consent of military personnel is not required to
administer standard medical treatments. 16
While FDA had in other circumstances authorized the administration of IND
products for treatment purposes, 17 DOD's request that FDA waive the requirement
of informed consent in this context was without regulatory precedent. FDA's
informed consent regulations contain exceptions in circumstances where consent is
not "feasible," but this exception had previously been narrowly limited to cases of
clear incapacity under emergent conditions.' 8  DOD's interpretation of
infeasibility, by contrast, included competent military personnel whose refusal of
what DOD considered to be the best available treatment would constitute an
unacceptable threat to other personnel and to combat objectives.' 9
The Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition in this section with respect to a
specific research project to advance the development of a medical product necessary to the
armed forces if the research project may directly benefit the subject and is carried out in
accordance with all other applicable laws.
10 U.S.C.A. § 980(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).
16. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY COMMAND POL'Y: ARMY REGULATION 600-20, § 5-4 (May
13, 2002), http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r600 20.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). The
Regulation also states that "a soldier on active duty or active duty for training will usually be required
to submit to medical care considered necessary to preserve his or her life, alleviate undue suffering, or
protect or maintain the health of others." Id.
17. See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text; Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug,
21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2004).
18. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2004) provides that "no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations unless the
investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally
authorized representative." Id. Prior to the Interim Rule, section 50.23(a) provided that consent "shall
be deemed feasible" unless both the investigator and a non-participating physician certify in writing
that:
(1) The human subject is confronted by a life-threatening situation necessitating the use of
the test article. (2) Informed consent cannot be obtained from the subject because of an
inability to communicate with, or obtain legally effective consent from, the subject. (3)
Time is not sufficient to obtain consent from the subject's legal representative. (4) There is
available no alternative method of approved or generally recognized therapy that provides
an equal or greater likelihood of saving the life of the subject.
21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a).
19. See Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics, 55 Fed. Reg. at 52,815. The Assistant
Secretary's request stated:
In all peacetime applications, we believe strongly in informed consent and its ethical
foundations. In peacetime applications, we readily agree to tell military personnel, as
provided in FDA's regulations, that research is involved, that there may be risks or
discomforts, that participation is voluntary and that refusal to participate will involve no
penalty. But military combat is different. If a soldier's life will be endangered by nerve
gas, for example, it is not acceptable from a military standpoint to defer to whatever might
be the soldier's personal preference concerning a preventive or therapeutic treatment that
might save his life, avoid endangerment of the other personnel in his unit and accomplish
the combat mission. Based on unalterable requirements of the military field commander, it
is not an option to excuse a non-consenting soldier from the military mission, nor would it
be defensible militarily - or ethically - to send the soldier unprotected into danger.
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FDA granted the Assistant Secretary's request while imposing several
conditions. FDA's Interim Rule 50.23(d), issued in 1990, included time-limits on
the period of waiver, the requirement that requests for waiver be made in writing,
IRB review of the proposed administration of an [ND product to troops, and the
maintenance of records regarding product administration.20 Following the issuance
of the Interim Rule, DOD submitted, and FDA granted, specific waiver requests
for PB and BT.2'
Although a federal appellate court upheld FDA's decision as a proper
exercise of the agency's authority, 22 critics argued at the time, and continue to
20. Id. at 52,817. Under the Interim Rule, any waiver request was "limited to a specific military
operation involving combat or the immediate threat of combat," and time-limited to twelve months, and
any determination that obtaining consent was NOT feasible was similarly limited. Id. Requests were
required to include written justification supporting the conclusions of the military physician and
investigator identified in the [ND that:
[A] military combat emergency exists because of special military combat (actual or
threatened) circumstances in which, in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the
military mission, preservation of the health of the individual and the safety of other
personnel require that a particular treatment be provided to a specified group of military
personnel, without regard to what might be any individual's personal preference for no
treatment or some alternative treatment.
Id. The requests were required to include a statement that an institutional review board (RB) had
reviewed and approved the use of the investigational product without consent. Id. FDA Commissioner
could grant the request "only when withholding treatment would be contrary to the best interests of
military personnel and there is no available satisfactory alternative therapy." Id. In making the
determination, the Commissioner would consider:
(i) the extent and strength of the evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the
investigational drug for the intended use; (ii) the context in which the drug will be
administered, e.g., whether it is intended for use in a battlefield or hospital setting or
whether it will be self-administered or will be administered by a health professional; (iii)
the nature of the disease or condition for which the preventive or therapeutic treatment is
intended; and (iv) the nature of the information to be provided to the recipients of the
drug concerning the potential benefits and risks of taking or not taking the drug.
Id. FDA also exempted DOD from many of the record-keeping requirements usually mandated for
administration of IND products. RETTIG, supra note I, at 19. DOD contended that detailed record-
keeping regarding what products were administered, when, and to whom, were not possible under
conditions of battle. Id. FDA agreed to waive or reduce some of the record-keeping requirements, and
DOD appears to have agreed, before the fact, to conduct some degree of record-keeping. Id.
Notwithstanding prior agreements, however, DOD was later faulted for its inadequate record-keeping,
which impeded the ability to study the possible health-effects experienced by veterans. DOD also
requested a waiver from the labeling requirements for [ND products. Id. at 17. Such products
ordinarily must contain language stating "Caution: New Drug - Limited by Federal (or United States)
law to investigational use." Labeling of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.6(a) (2004).
DOD argued that this language would undermine soldiers' confidence in the product and even
encourage non-use. RETTIG, supra note I, at 17. FDA therefore permitted different labeling that stated
"FOR MILITARY USE AND EVALUATION." Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination That
Informed Consent Is NOT Feasible or Is Contrary to the Best Interests of Recipients, 64 Fed. Reg.
54180, 54,184 (Oct. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 312).
21. Id. at 54,183-84.
22. Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1991). In Sullivan, the district court rejected a
service member's challenge to Interim Rule 50.23(d) on the basis that the military's decision to
administer unapproved drugs to troops was "precisely the type of military decision that courts have
repeatedly refused to second-guess." Id. at 15. While the appellate court reversed the lower court's
[VOL. 8:1:38
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maintain, that FDA was complicit in serious ethical violations perpetrated by DOD
against its personnel.23 While criticism may have been fueled in part by concerns
that unapproved treatments could have been a causal factor in Gulf War
Syndrome,24 critics also insist that the use of investigational products constitutes
human experimentation and is categorically prohibited, both ethically and legally,
unless all the requirements for human subjects protection, including the
requirements for informed consent, are met. 25 They consider the unconsented-to
administration of an investigational product to be a per se violation of human
rights, and ground this position in the first principle of the Nuremberg Code.26
This paper takes issue with that claim. It argues that horrific atrocities of the
past are a poor paradigm when considering the therapeutic use of investigational
products in emergent circumstances. While there should be, in 2004, no dispute
that using another human being solely as a means in the service of gaining
scientific knowledge is ethically abhorrent, this principle does not shed light on
how to resolve the vexing problem of ensuring the timely availability of safe and
effective therapeutic agents to protect both military personnel and civilians from
emergent health threats - both those that are the result of bioterrorism and those
that are of natural origin. In addition, as a purely definitional matter, the
administration of a product for the purpose of treatment cannot constitute
"research" as it is currently defined in federal regulations.
This paper posits instead a new regulatory paradigm, one that draws clear
lines between research and treatment activities, and that recognizes that a product's
finding on review because it construed the petitioners' case as a challenge to the authority of FDA, not
DOD, it did not refute the lower court's assertion that the underlying decision whether or not to
administer the drugs was within the sole discretion of the military. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
23. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Blinded By Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21'
Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33 (2003) [hereinafter Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism]; George J.
Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using Investigational
Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 245 (1998) [hereinafter Annas, Protecting Soldiers
from Friendly Fire]. See also Michael J. O'Connor, Note, Bearing True Faith and Allegiance?
Allowing Recovery for Soldiers Under Fire in Military Experiments that Violate the Nuremberg Code,
25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 649 (2002); Claire A. Milner, Comment, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is
Informed Consent Optional During War?, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. & POL'Y 199 (1996); Robyn
Pforr Ryan, Should Combat Troops Be Given the Option of Refusing Investigational Drug Treatment?,
52 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 377 (1997); Suzanne B. Seftel, Waiving for the Flag: Should Informed Consent
Rules Apply in the Context of Military Emergencies?, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1387 (1992).
24. While no single definitive cause of Gulf War Syndrome has been identified, PB has been
identified as a possible contributor to the development of at least some of the illnesses reported by Gulf
War veterans. See, e.g., BEATRICE ALEXANDRA GOLOMB, NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE AS IT PERTAINS TO GULF WAR ILLNESSES: PYRIDOSTIGMINE
BROMIDE 3-4, n. 1 (1999), http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1018.2/MR1018.2.pdf/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005).
25. E.g., O'Connor, supra note 23, at 676-77.
26. See, e.g., Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism, supra note 23, at 37; Annas, Protecting Soldiers
from Friendly Fire, supra note 23, at 246-47.
2005]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
safety and effectiveness can be under investigation while it is simultaneously
administered with a therapeutic or prophylactic intent. Moreover, it argues that
recipients of investigational products for therapeutic purposes do not fall into the
category of "research subjects" merely because of the product's investigational
status. Rather, they are research subjects only if the product is administered for the
purposes and in the context of research. While recipients of investigational
products administered for therapeutic purposes must, legally and ethically, receive
full information about the risks and benefits of the investigational product, such
disclosure would not be different in kind (though possibly in degree) from the
disclosures that are required to be made to all patients undergoing medical
treatment.
This paper further proposes that this paradigm receive concrete expression
through a new category of FDA regulatory approval, tentatively termed "interim
approval" or "limited use approval." Such a paradigm shift would create a clearer
distinction between activities that are correctly considered research and those more
appropriately viewed as treatment. This distinction could help restore public
confidence in human subjects research and eliminate specious claims that
recipients of IND products are "guinea pigs" simply by virtue of the product's
investigational status. In addition, this new paradigm could foster availability of
less-than-fully-approved products with adequate disclosure and safeguards in cases
where the product is reasonably believed to constitute the best available therapy to
combat an emergent health threat.
II. NUREMBERG: HISTORY AND CODE
During World War II, Nazis used concentration camp prisoners in a variety of
experiments aimed at gaining scientific knowledge beneficial to their own soldiers
and citizens, while also causing severe pain, serious injury, and death to the
research subjects.27 Such experiments included infecting healthy prisoners with
malaria, typhus, and other infectious agents to test antidotes or vaccines.28 Many
prisoners died either from the disease or the treatments being tested.29 In other
experiments, prisoners were put in low-pressure tanks to see how long they could
survive without oxygen, were forced to remain outdoors without clothing in
freezing weather so that rewarming could be attempted, were subjected to chemical
or x-ray sterilization, or were fed poisons through their food. 30  There was
27. ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 2 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al.
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absolutely no therapeutic intent in any of these experiments; to the contrary their
aim was to inflict harm as well as to gain knowledge.
After the war, these medical experiments came to light during the
Nuremberg Doctors Trials, at which twenty-three Nazi doctors were tried, and
seven hanged, for their participation in wartime atrocities. 3' The judges of the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal also articulated what became known as the
Nuremberg Code, ten principles defining acceptable research involving humans.
32
The first principle of the Code states that the "voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential. 33 It goes on to explain:
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental
subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected;
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from
his participation in the experiment.
34
31. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire, supra note 23, at 245-46; Alexander
Mitscherlich & Fred Mielke, Epilogue: Seven Were Hanged, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBURG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 105 (George J. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBURG CODE].
32. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire, supra note 23, at 246.
33. NUERNBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 181 (1949).
34. Id. at 181-82. The Nuremberg Code continues:
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in
nature. 3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem
under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. 4.
The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental
suffering and injury. 5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects. 6. The degree of
risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of
the problem to be solved by the experiment. 7. Proper preparations should be made and
adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote
possibilities of injury, disability, or death. 8. The experiment should be conducted only by
scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required
through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment. 9.
During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the
experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of
the experiment seems to him to be impossible. 10. During the course of the experiment
the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has
2005]
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The Nuremberg Code has been termed "the most widely known document on
the ethics of research. 35  Certainly it was an important declaration of human
rights, setting boundaries on wartime treatment of prisoners and categorically
renouncing certain modes of behavior toward other human beings. At the same
time, the document, perhaps not surprisingly, did not generate much reaction from
United States physicians. Many physicians and researchers viewed it as a "good
code for barbarians but an unnecessary code for ordinary physicians." 36 United
States researchers felt it "had its origins in extraordinary circumstances" and
therefore was "not necessarily pertinent" to the United States research context.37
While United States history does contain incidents in which patients or healthy
"volunteers" were the unwitting subjects of experiments with no therapeutic
intent,38 this was not the context in which most United States researchers viewed
themselves. 39 Given its origins, the Nuremberg Code did not seem applicable to
sick patients for whom participation in research might be beneficial.
The leaders of the international medical community therefore tried to mesh
the standards enunciated in the Nuremberg Code with the realities of medical
research. The 1964 statement by the World Medical Association, commonly
known as the Declaration of Helsinki, ° created two separate categories laying out
rules for human experimentation: "Clinical Research Combined with Professional
Care," and "Nontherapeutic Clinical Research. 'A In the former category,
physicians were required to obtain consent from patient-subjects only when
"consistent with patient psychology." In nontherapeutic clinical research, the
consent requirements were more absolute: "Clinical research on a human being
probably [sic] cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful
judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury,
disability, or death to the experimental subject.
Id.
35. ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS, supra note 27, at 2.
36. Ruth R. Faden et al., U.S. Medical Researchers, the Nuremberg Doctors Trial, and the
Nuremberg Code, in ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS, supra note 27, at 8. (quoting Jay Katz, The
Consent Principle of the Nuremburg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREMBURG CODE, supra note 31, at 228).
37. Id. at 10 (quoting Memorandum from Joseph W. Gardella, Assistant Dean, Harvard Med.
School, to George P. Berry, Dean, Harvard Medical School (1961)).
38. For a discussion of some of these historical abuses see ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS,
supra note 27, at 1-23.
39. See generally Jonathan D. Moreno, Reassessing the Influence of the Nuremberg Code on
American Medical Ethics, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 347 (1997) (arguing that "recent
revelations about Cold War era deliberations among high ranking officials enable a . . . deeper
understanding of the Code's role during the years following the war ... ").
40. THE WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1964), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
41. Id.
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cannot be undertaken without his free consent, after he has been fully informed. 42
Unlike the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki allowed for third-party
permission from a legal guardian.43 The Declaration was widely approved by
United States medical researchers who viewed it as more practical and more
tailored to their circumstances.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES REGULATIONS TO PROTECT
RESEARCH SUBJECTS
One particularly egregious United States example of medical
experimentation on patients with no potential for therapeutic benefit was the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, sponsored by the United States Public Health Service
from 1932 to 1972. The study's purpose was to determine the natural course of
untreated, latent syphilis, and the subjects were black males.44 No treatment was
offered to the study participants, nor were they informed of its availability, even
after penicillin became available in the 1950s.
45
This episode, as well as several others, led to the passage of the National
Research Act 46 in 1974, which established the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.4 7 The
Commission, in turn, issued the seminal Belmont Report, which proposed ethical
principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research.48 In
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HIV, STD, AND TB PREVENTION, CDC, TIMELINE - THE
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: A HARD LESSON LEARNED (2004) [hereinafter CDC, TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
STUDY], http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); see also Allan
M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in ETHICAL AND
REGULATORY ASPECTS, supra note 27, at 20-23.
45. See CDC, TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 44; see also Brandt, supra note 44.
46. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. Id. at 348. Title 1I of the Act, Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, enumerated the duties of the Commission, which included:
identify[ing] the basic ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of biomedical
and behavioral research involving human subjects, develop[ing] guidelines [for] such
research .... , and mak[ing] recommendations to the Secretary (I) for ... administrative
action ... to apply such guidelines. . ., and (II) concerning any other matter pertaining to
the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research.
Id. at 349.
48. NAT'L COMM. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, FDA, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/04/briefing/2004-4066bl_22_Belmont%20Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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particular, the Belmont Report articulated three principles - respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice - that should undergird all human subjects research.49
This report became the basis for the implementation of regulations to protect
human subjects, now known as the "Common Rule., 50 These regulations apply to
research conducted at all federal institutions and to all federally funded research
with human subjects.it  The regulations define "research" as "a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge." 52 These regulations also apply
to any research for which a federal agency has oversight responsibility - including
investigational new drug requirements overseen by FDA.53
The Common Rule requires institutional review boards (IRB) to review
research protocols in accordance with specified requirements. The IRB is required
to review all research protocols and has the authority to approve, require
modification of, or disapprove of all research activities covered by the Rule.54 In
order to approve a protocol, the IRB must determine that risks to subjects are
minimized; that risks are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits; that
selection of subjects is equitable; that the research plan makes adequate provision
for data monitoring, if needed, to protect subject safety; that privacy and
confidentiality of data are maintained; that vulnerable subjects are adequately
protected; and that informed consent is sought from all subjects or their legal
representatives and is appropriately documented.55
The Common Rule also outlines the required elements of informed
consent. At its essence, informed consent requires the researcher to provide
necessary information to the research subject so that the subject can make a
reasoned judgment about whether to participate in the research.56 To that end, the
subject must be provided a "statement that the study involves research, an
explanation of the purposes of the research and the expected duration of the
subject's participation, a description of the procedures to be followed, and
identification of any procedures which are experimental. 57 Other information that
must be provided includes: (1) any reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts
49. Id. at 2, 4-6.
50. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2003). For references to the "Common Rule,"
see OFFICE OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS TITLE 45: PUBLIC WELFARE, at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).
52. Id. § 46.102(d).
53. Id. § 46.102(e).
54. Id. § 46.109(a).
55. Id. §46.111.
56. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2003).
57. Id. § 46.116(a)(I).
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from the research, (2) any benefits to the subject or to others that may reasonably
be expected to arise from the research, (3) any alternatives to the research that
might be beneficial to the subject, (4) information on compensation or treatment, if
any, that will be provided in case of injury, and (5) a statement that participation is
voluntary and may be discontinued by the subject at any time without penalty.58
Informed consent must, in most cases, be documented in writing.59
IV. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT
Nuremberg and United States research abuses led to the development of a
defined, formalized, and rigorous process for activities falling within the definition
of "research." While some have argued the process is too rigid60 and others have
claimed that its protections are inadequate, 6 1 there is today a distinct and
identifiable enterprise known as clinical research.
Traveling a different path, another legal tradition evolved within the rubric of
tort law, that of informed consent to medical treatment. Informed consent in this
context has its origins in the tort of battery.62 In the 1914 case Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital,63 Justice Cardozo opined that "[e]very human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."'64 Several other cases
during the same time period demonstrated that courts would find physicians
(typically surgeons) liable for battery if they performed an operation without first
securing the patient's consent or deviated during the course of surgery from the
procedure that had been agreed to by the patient.65 The patient's consent to the
treatment thus distinguished the tort of battery from legally permissible treatment.
While the tort of battery served to ensure that the patient consented, it did not
necessarily follow that the doctor had a duty to provide information to the patient
58. Id. § 46.116(a)(2)-(8).
59. Id. § 46.117.
60. E.g., Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REV. 205,
208-1I (1996) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent as applied to critical care research and its
various deficiencies).
61. E.g., Sharona Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs,
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 71 (2003) (arguing for the enhancement of protections for human subjects of clinical
research).
62. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
119-20 (1986).
63. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
64. Id. at 93.
65. For a discussion of these cases, see FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 62, at 120-23.
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to ensure that such consent was informed. The 1957 case Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. University Board of Trustees66 made the requirement of informed consent
explicit for the first time, holding that physicians must disclose "any facts which
are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment. 67  While Salgo relied on battery theory to justify this
requirement, later cases began to shift the legal analysis, and to rely on negligence
theory in evaluating whether a patient had been injured by the doctor's failure to
obtain informed consent.68 Through these cases, the failure to secure informed
consent itself became a tort, i.e., the basis for a lawsuit against a doctor separate
from whether the doctor's actual treatment deviated from acceptable practice.69
A physician cannot, of course, disclose every foreseeable circumstance. To
determine whether the physician has discharged the informed consent obligation,
courts apply a "materiality" standard, meaning information that will be material to
the patient's decision-making process.7 ° Material information includes the nature,
consequences, risks, and alternatives to, a particular course of treatment.71 Some
courts view materiality from the physician's perspective, asking what a reasonable
physician would have disclosed under the circumstances, while others apply a
patient-centered view of materiality, asking whether the information would be
material to the reasonable patient under the particular circumstances.72
One issue that courts have had to consider in determining materiality is
whether the fact that a treatment is "innovative" or "experimental" is always
material.73 While the case law does not evidence a coherent principle, it clearly
demonstrates that such information is not presumptively material.74 For example,
66. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
67. Id. at 181.
68. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 62, at 129-32. See also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093,
1106 (Kan. 1960) (limiting a physician's duty to disclose to "those disclosures which a reasonable
medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances" and reasoning that "where
the patient fully appreciates the danger involved, the failure of a physician in his duty to make a
reasonable disclosure to the patient would have no causal relation to the injury"), reh 'g denied, 354
P.2d 670, 673 (clarifying that "[n]egligence is an essential element of malpractice, and.., a causal
relation must be established by the patient, between the negligent act of the physician and the injury of
the patient, to sustain the burden of proof where damages are sought in a malpractice action for injury").
69. FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, supra note 62, at 132-34. See also Lars Noah, Informed Consent
and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361
(2002).
70. Id. at 367-68.
71. Id. at 365-67.
72. Id. at 367-68.
73. Id. at 371.
74. See id. at 371-72 (citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 175,
180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Kan. 1960); Fortner v. Koch, 261
N.W. 762, 765 (Mich. 1935); Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998); Klein v.
Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101,
107-08 (Pa. 2001); Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135-37 (Utah 1989); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D.
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courts have rejected the argument that a physician must always disclose the off-
label use of an FDA approved product. 75 On the other hand, when the particular
treatment or product use deviates too much from the "norm," courts have found
disclosure of such deviation by the physician to be material.76
Thus, the law recognizes that the physician, acting in what he or she
perceives is the best interest of the patient, may need to rely on "innovation" or
"experimentation," and that such behavior does not necessarily constitute
malpractice." The law has also recognized that such innovative practice need not
always be disclosed to the patient.78 The law realizes that every therapeutic
decision is individualized, and therefore not exactly like the previous one, but the
type and degree of disclosure depends on individual circumstances.79
Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 71, 100-01 (1998)).
75. The term "off-label use" refers to a product that has been approved for one indication by FDA
and is subsequently administered by a health care provider for a use not indicated in its labeling may
constitute an off-label use. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL
INVESTIGATORS: 1998 UPDATE, http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/offlabel.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2005). FDA has long taken the position that the decision to administer a product for indications not
included in labeling is within the scope of medical practice and constitutes a clinical judgment, and is
therefore not appropriately within the purview of FDA regulations. See id. For many diseases, off-
label prescribing is a necessary and even indispensable part of appropriate medical treatment. E.g., Beck
& Azari, supra note 74 (arguing that physicians should not be required to explain FDA regulatory status
of drugs and medical devices in informed consent discussions with patients).
76. Noah, supra note 69, at 372 (citing Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202, 1207
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710, 712-13 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Shadrick v. Coker,
963 S.W.2d 726, 729-30, 734-35, 736-37 (Tenn. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.81 l-A(a)(5)
(1999)).
77. See, e.g., Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (Mich. 1935) ("We recognize the fact that, if the
general practice of medicine and surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of
experimentation carried on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and consent of the
patient or those responsible for him, and must not vary too radically from the accepted method of
procedure."); Salgo, 317 P.2d at 180 (concluding that a drug manufacturer's written instructions for
using a drug "cannot establish as a matter of law the standard of care required of a physician in the use
of the drug."); Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 254 P.2d 85, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (finding
that "[in fighting so dangerous a condition as [the cancer] here involved, physicians may take serious
risks and in doing so must rely on their judgment in deciding how far to go" and that "[t]o hold
[physicians] responsible in the cases where the bad chance unfortunately materializes would be
evidently unjust and most dangerous if physicians were deterred from going to the extent which gives
their patient the best chance of survival."); Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that an action for non-therapeutic experimentation must be measured by "traditional
malpractice evidentiary standards" and that therefore "[w]hether there was informed consent is
necessarily linked to the charge of experimentation..." (footnote omitted)); Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d
48, 65 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that defendant physician's reporting of negative results of an
experimental treatment conducted on patients represented by plaintiffs was not an admission of
negligence and that although "medical research at times produces results less than hoped for... [t]his
does not logically lead to the conclusion that the research should not be undertaken.").
78. See, e.g., Beck & Azari, supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106 (noting that as long as a physician's disclosure is
"sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses should not be
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The Belmont Report also recognized early on that even what is considered
medical treatment inherently blurs at the edges with the research enterprise. The
report tried to distill the essential differences between research and therapy:
It is important to distinguish between biomedical . . . research on the
one hand, and the practice of accepted therapy on the other, in order to
know what activities ought to undergoreview [sic] for the protection of
human subjects of research. The distinction between research and
practice is blurred partly because both often occur together (as in
research designed to evaluate a therapy) and partly because notable
departures from standard practice are often called "experimental" when
the terms "experimental" and "research are not carefully defined ....
[T]he term 'research' designates an activity designed to test an
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in
theories, principles, and statements of relationships). Research is
usually described in a formal protocol that sets forth an objective and a
set of procedures designed to reach that objective. When a clinician
departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the
innovation does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a
procedure is 'experimental,' in the sense of new, untested or different,
does not automatically place it in the category of research. Radically
new procedures of this description should, however, be made the object
of formal research at an early stage in order to determine whether they
are safe and effective.
80
Thus it is the requirement that "generalizable knowledge" be sought that
distinguishes the research enterprise; the requirement that individual patient benefit
be expected is the hallmark of medical treatment. As the next section will show,
when IND products are used for therapeutic purposes, this distinction becomes
blurred.
V. THE EROSION OF THE RESEARCH/TREATMENT DISTINCTION
A. AIDS, Cancer, and Changes to IND and Approval Rules
Efforts to break down the walls of separation between "research" and
"treatment" can be traced to the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s. While the early
history of human subjects research was aimed at limiting entry through stringent
hurdles, AIDS patients successfully turned this effort on its head by demanding
called into question if it appears, all circumstances considered, that the physician was motivated only by
the patient's best interests").
80. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 48, at 3.
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unapproved therapies. 8' Their demands were based on their belief in the
therapeutic potential of these IND products and their perception that the barriers to
approval of these products were too high.82 Those who sought IND products
outside research protocols did not necessarily want to be research subjects; rather,
they wanted earlier access to what they perceived as beneficial treatments. Some
activists even resorted to sabotaging, or threatening to sabotage, research protocols
to achieve their goals.
83
FDA ultimately created a more flexible regulatory scheme in response to their
demands, recognizing that the risk preferences of patients facing life-threatening
illnesses should be accorded some deference when deciding when a drug should be
made available. The changes made by FDA to drug approval "marked a seminal
,,84
event in the evolution of new drug approval policy at FDA. First, in 1987, the
agency issued a final rule specifying the conditions under which investigational
new drugs could be administered to patients with severe medical conditions.
85
FDA articulated the purpose of the rule as "facilitat[ing] the availability of
promising new drugs to [desperately ill] patients as early in the drug development
process as possible [before general marketing begins] and to obtain additional data
on the drug's safety and effectiveness.,
86
FDA rule established what the agency termed a "treatment IND." Under the
rule, a drug can be used for treatment if:
8 1. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening
Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 315-21 (2000); Nancy K. Plant, Adequate Well-
Controlled Clinical Trials: Reopening the Black Box, I WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 267, 285-89 (1996). See
also Lisa Terrizzi, The Need for Improved Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Activists and
Their Call for a Parallel Track Policy, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 596-99 (1991) (discussing regulatory
changes in FDA policy regarding distribution of experimental drugs to AIDS patients).
82. Greenberg, supra note 81; Plant, supra note 81. See also Terrizzi, supra note 81, at 598 n. 45
(describing arguments regarding the morality of clinical trials aimed at non-terminally ill populations).
83. For example, one AIDS activist group established a method by which patients could have their
clinical trial supply analyzed, thus "un-blinding" the study. Plant, supra note 81, at 286. At one FDA
Advisory Committee meeting concerning early access, AIDS activist Larry Kramer stated: "If we do
not get these drugs you will see an uprising, the likes of which you have never seen before since the
Vietnam War in this country. We will sabotage all of your Phase I studies." Id. at 289 (citing Terrizzi,
supra note 81, at 622). The term "blinding" refers to procedures that prevent participants in a clinical
trial from knowing whether they are receiving the drug being investigated or some other substance (e.g.,
placebo).
84. Greenberg, supra note 81, at 296.
85. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg.
19,466, 19,466 (May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) [hereinafter Investigational Drug
Regulations]. According to FDA, comments were received from representatives of "virtually every
affected constituency," including "consumers, consumer group leaders, health professionals and health
care providers, representatives of specific disease and orphan drug organizations, state and local health
departments, clinical investigators and research institutions, institutional review boards, pharmaceutical
manufacturers, and former FDA officials." Id.
86. Id.
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(i) the drug is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening
disease; (ii) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or
other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended
patient population; (iii) the drug is under investigation in a controlled
clinical trial under an [ND in effect for the trial, or all clinical trials have
been completed; and (iv) the sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is
actively pursuing marketing approval of the investigational drug with
due diligence. 87
Sponsors seeking to use an IND drug for treatment were required to submit a
treatment protocol to FDA containing information such as the rationale for using
the drug and the criteria for patient selection.88 The sponsor was not required to
wait for FDA approval to begin, but rather could begin 30 days after submission
unless FDA said otherwise. 89 Another important component of the rule was that
FDA permitted a sponsor or investigator to charge for the drug used in a treatment
protocol provided that certain conditions were met. 90 This was a departure from
the prohibition against charging for investigational products, and provided
important incentives to companies to provide their investigational products to
patients.
The treatment IND demonstrated FDA's willingness to permit seriously ill
people to accept more risk in the interest of obtaining potentially beneficial
treatments. 91 However, FDA did so while still retaining the "investigational new
drug" framework. As a regulatory matter, people receiving products under a
treatment [ND were still, at least implicitly, research subjects, since the regulations
required compliance with the IND provisions. According to the treatment IND
regulations:
Treatment use of an investigational drug is conditioned on the sponsor
and investigators complying with the safeguards of the [ND process,
87. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (2004). The
rule defined "immediately life threatening" to mean "a stage of disease in which there is a reasonable
likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without
early treatment." Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(ii). The preamble to the final rule also provided the following
illustrative list of diseases fitting this definition: "Advanced cases of AIDS; Advanced congestive heart
failure (New York Heart Association Class IV); Recurrent sustained ventricular tachycardia or
ventricular fibrillation; Herpes simplex encephalitis; Most advanced metastatic refractory cancers; Far
advanced emphysema; Severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome; Bacterial endocarditis; and
Subarachnoid hemorrhage." Investigational Drug Regulations, supra note 85, at 19,467.
88. 21 C.F.R. § 312.25(a) (2004).
89. Id. § 312.40(b) (2004).
90. Investigational Drug Regulations, supra note 85, at 19,467.
91. For example, in the preamble to the Interim Rule promulgated to expedite treatments for life-
threatening or debilitating illnesses, the agency observed that "[tihe procedures contained in this rule
reflect the recognition that physicians and patients are generally willing to accept greater risks or side
effects from products that treat life-threatening and severely-debilitating illnesses." Investigational New
Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516, 41,518 (Oct. 21,
1988) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312 and 314) [hereinafter Investigational Drug Regulations I1].
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including the regulations governing informed consent (21 CFR part 50)
and institutional review boards (21 CFR part 56) and the applicable
provisions of part 312, including distribution of the drug through
qualified experts, maintenance of adequate manufacturing facilities, and
submission of IND safety reports.92
In 1988, FDA again issued a rule intended to expand access to products for
life-threatening 93 or severely debilitating 94 illnesses at an earlier stage of
development - this time by reducing the number of research steps that were
necessary before a product could be administered. The new rule permitted a
departure from the classic phase I, II, III approach.95 Instead, FDA stated it would
consider approval of the drug following phase II investigational studies, without
the need for phase III, which would potentially save a significant amount of time:
FDA believes that if sufficient attention is paid to the quality and
amount of data obtained in phase 2, it should be possible to identify
early those drugs that represent safe and effective treatments for life-
threatening and severely-debilitating diseases - and to develop the
evidence needed for their marketing - in the course of carrying out the
first controlled trials.96
This early approval was predicated on early and frequent meetings between
sponsors and FDA reviewers to discuss the design of animal and clinical studies.
92. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(c) (2004).
93. Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Severely-Debilitating Illnesses, 21 C.F.R. §
312.81 (2003). The rule defined life threatening diseases as: "(1) Diseases or conditions where the
likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted; and (2) Diseases or conditions
with potentially fatal outcomes, where the end point of clinical trial analysis is survival." Id.
94. Id. The rule defined severely debilitating illnesses as: "diseases or conditions that cause major
irreversible morbidity." Id.
95. The clinical trial process is typically described as consisting of three pre-approval phases. See
Investigational Drug Regulations I1, supra note 91, at 41,518. During Phase 1, the drug is tested on a
small number (twenty to eighty) of patients or healthy volunteers to study how the drug is tolerated,
metabolized, and excreted. Id. Phase I studies are not generally designed to assess drug efficacy
although they may provide some initial evidence in this regard. Id. Phase II studies are larger,
generally comprising 50 to 200 patients, and are the first time when both safety and effectiveness are
evaluated. Id. Finally, Phase II trials may include between 200 and 1000 patients or more, and are
intended to confirm and expand upon the safety and efficacy data obtained from the first two phases.
Id. These phases are not statutorily required, and they are by no means absolute: indeed, some officials
within FDA have tried to get away from the "phase 1, 11, 111" terminology because of concerns that it
conveys an unduly "mechanistic" description of the process. Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish
the "Gold Standard" for New Drug Approval? Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 143 (1999) (citing International Conference on
Harmonisation; Guidance on General Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,113 (Dec. 17,
1997)). For example, a 1997 Guidance Document suggested that a Phase 1I study be referred to as
"therapeutic exploratory" and a Phase III study be referred to as "therapeutic confirmatory." Id.
Nevertheless, the phase 1, II, 11 terminology appears to remain the standard in the scientific and legal
literature and common parlance, as well as FDA's own regulations. Investigational New Drug
Application (IND), 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2004).
96. Investigational Drug Regulations I1, supra note 91, at 41,518.
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It was anticipated that sponsors would make use of the treatment protocol
provisions established in the previous years to administer the drug to patients while
preparing the marketing application. 97  Finally, FDA anticipated that post-
marketing (phase IV) studies would be used to obtain additional information about
a product's risks, benefits, and optimal use.
98
Again, while the purpose of this truncated approval process was to speed the
approval of therapeutic products to severely ill patients, the mechanism and
framework used was the IND regulations. The regulations provided that:
All of the safeguards... designed to ensure the safety of clinical testing
and the safety of products following marketing approval apply to drugs
covered by this section. This includes the requirements for informed
consent (part 50 of this chapter) and institutional review boards (part 56
of this chapter). These safeguards further include the review of animal
studies prior to initial human testing (§ 312.23), and the monitoring of
adverse drug experiences through the requirements of [ND safety
reports (§ 312.32), safety update reports during agency review of a
marketing application (§ 314.50 of this chapter), and postmarketing
adverse reaction reporting (§ 314.80 of this chapter). 99
FDA therefore created a regulatory "hybrid" under which the recipient of a
product pursuant to these regulations could be construed simultaneously as a
patient and a research subject. While this hybrid was created to achieve a specific
and laudable objective, it has also arguably contributed to the ongoing erosion
between the "research" and "treatment" enterprises.
B. Further Erosion During 1991 Gulf War; Confusion in the Aftermath of 9/1]
The 1991 Gulf War occurred at a time when traditional distinctions between
"research" and "treatment" were being eroded, without explicit regulatory
acknowledgment of this shift. Administration of IND products to AIDS patients
technically fell within FDA's IND regulations and therefore constituted
"research."' 00 Consistent with its regulatory context, consent of the recipients was
required.' 0' Yet the intent of permitting the administration of IND products to
97. Treatment Protocols, 21 C.F.R. § 312.83 (2003).
98. Investigational Drug Regulations I I, supra note 91, at 41,518.
99. Safeguards for Patient Safety, 21 C.F.R. § 312.88 (2004).
100. See Investigational Drug Regulations 11, supra note 91, at 41,517 (using FDA's successful
development, evaluation and approval of zidovudine, the first drug approved to treat AIDS, through the
use of the four phase clinical trial involving AIDS patients, as an example of how administration to
humans of INDs within FDA rules constitutes "research").
101. See generally Informed Consent of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2004) (establishing
the requirements for informed consent of human subjects in clinical trials of INDs); Elements of
Informed Consent, 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (specifying the elements that constitute informed consent under
the Investigational New Drug clinical trial regulation).
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AIDS patients, cancer patients, and others was, at least in part, to improve the
health status of the individual recipient. This is generally considered treatment, or
medical practice.
DOD further eroded the research/treatment distinction in its request to FDA
by seeking a waiver of consent, using a broadened conception of infeasibility. But
the military's intent was not to conduct research (i.e., to gain generalizable
knowledge), but to protect troops from perceived threats. 10 2 Indeed, DOD was
faulted for not maintaining records that could have permitted better evaluation of
the impact of treatment on troops and thus could have led to more generalizable
information.
10 3
Neither the Nuremberg Code nor FDA's IND regulations contemplated the
scenario DOD faced in 1991 and that it faces now: What if, based on all available
information, there is a good faith reason to believe that a drug, vaccine, or other
medical product may be therapeutic, but testing falls below the "gold standard"'0
4
that we have come to expect? While from a regulatory perspective such a product
is "investigational," it does not follow that the motive to administer it is an
experimental one - the sole or primary motive may in fact be, as it was in the 1991
situation, to protect troops. In 1991, DOD presented FDA with an investigational
product and a therapeutic motivation. 10 5  This circumstance does not fit the
definition of "research," i.e., the pursuit of generalizable knowledge to support a
hypothesis. 10 6 Nor do the words "investigational" or "experimental," at least as
they are popularly understood, capture the nature of the enterprise. This is not a
merely semantic distinction; the word "experimentation" in particular packs a
powerful punch in the popular mind and brings to mind Nuremberg and a host of
other atrocities committed against vulnerable populations.
The lack of precise terminology has led not only to distrust of the
government, but also to confusion in both the public's mind and in at least one
federal court. For example, following 9/11, when anthrax was found in letters sent
to members of Congress and others, those civilians at high risk of exposure were
offered the anthrax vaccine.' 0 7 Most declined, probably because of concerns about
its safety, which may have been exacerbated by the government's unwillingness to
102. RETTIG, supra note 1, at 21; see also note 15 and accompanying text.
103. RETTIG, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing Presidential Advisory Committee Report).
104. The phrase "gold standard" has been used to refer to FDA's high standards for product
approval generally as well as to the classic two randomized double-blinded controlled clinical trial
standard for drug approval. See, e.g., Kulynych, supra note 95.
105. See Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics, 55 Fed. Reg. at 52,814.
106. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2003).
107. See Justin Gillis, FDA Releases Anthrax Vaccine to Military, Approves More, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 2002, at A17, available at 2002 WL 10945005; see also Clemente Lisi, Spore Find Raises New
Mail Fears, N.Y. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at 15, available at 2001 WL 32605665.
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provide a recommendation regarding vaccination. 0 8 The vaccine had also been
administered on a mandatory basis to United States troops during the late 1990s.'1 9
Several hundred military personnel resigned or faced disciplinary proceedings as a
result of their refusal to take the vaccine because of concerns about its side
effects." 0
Contrary to what some critics have claimed and one federal district court
recently opined,"' the investigational status of the anthrax vaccine when
administered to troops on a mandatory basis or to civilians on a voluntary one was
by no means clear. The vaccine, named Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), was
licensed in 1970112 and used primarily by those in frequent contact with animals
through work in agriculture, the wool trade, or laboratory research. FDA-approved
labeling for the vaccine does not specify the route of anthrax exposure
(inhalational v. cutaneous) that it is intended to prevent." 13  In 1996, the
manufacturer submitted an IND to permit an explicit claim against inhalational
108. See Christine Haughney, Anthrax Vaccine Rejected, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2002, at A13,
available at 2002 WL 2518614; see also Sanjay Bhatt, As Deadline Passes, No New Takers for Anthrax
Vaccine, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at 4B, available at 2002 WL 5523247.
109. See Bradley Graham, Pentagon Plans to Inoculate Troops Against Anthrax Bacteria, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at A23, available at 1997 WL 16224214.
110. Thomas H. Maugh, I1, Science File Vaccinations Problematic Health: Anthrax and Smallpox
Shots Present Manufacturing Problems and Dangerous Side Effects, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 200 1, at A 14;
Jim Ritter, Anthrax Shot Fears Rise; More Troops Refusing Order to be Vaccinated, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1998, at 3. In addition, an unknown number of National Guard and reserve personnel chose to
leave rather than be vaccinated. Anthrax Vaccine: Hearing on Preliminary Results of GAO's Survey of
Guard/Reserve Pilots and Aircrew Members Before the House Comm. on Government Reform, 10 1st
Congress 1-2 (2000) (statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Applied Research and Methods),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0192t.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). In 2000, the GAO conducted a
survey of 1,253 randomly selected Guard and Reserve Pilots and other aircrew members to assess
attitudes about AVIP. Id. The survey found that anthrax was a key reason that participants cited for
leaving the military or changing their military status. Id.
11. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. D.C. 2003). This case was brought by active duty
service members, national guardsmen, and civilian contractors against the Department of Defense after
plaintiffs were instructed to submit to anthrax vaccinations without their consent. Id. at 122. Plaintiffs
argued that the anthrax vaccine was an experimental drug unlicensed for its present use and that the
DOD's Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) violated DOD's regulation, a Presidential
Executive Order, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 123. The district court issued a
preliminary injunction barring the non-consensual administrations of the vaccine, holding that the
vaccine was both an investigational drug and being used for an unapproved purpose. Id. A year later,
the court granted a stay of the injunction after FDA published a final rule categorizing AVA as safe and
effective for use against inhalational anthrax. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. D.C. 2004).
112. Vaccine Licensing and the Anthrax Vaccine: Hearing on Vaccine Licensing Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 101 st Cong. (2000) (statement by FDA), http://www.hhs.gov/aslltestify/
t000413d.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
113. FDA, LABEL OF ANTHRAX VACCINE ADSORBED (BIOTHRAX) (2002), http://www.fda.gov/cber/
label/biopava0131022LB.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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anthrax to be included in the labeled indication. 14 But this fact does not by itself
indicate that the previous labeling excluded an inhalational indication, only that
one could not specifically be claimed. While such a distinction may appear to be
analogous to a defense of "no controlling legal authority," in reality it gets to the
heart of the system of drug approval by FDA. FDA approval is based on the
"intended use" of the product, as evidenced most clearly by the labeled indication
for use.115 Thus the type of data required by the manufacturer for approval is
driven by what specific benefit the manufacturer wants to claim for the product.
The manufacturer cannot legally promote a product for a use not contained in the
labeled indication. 1 6 Therefore, the district court's inference that an inhalational
indication was investigational because DOD sought a labeling change was not
necessarily warranted.
Similarly, the use of anthrax for post-exposure prophylaxis, as it was offered
to some civilians following the mailing of anthrax-laced letters through the United
States mail, was not an investigational use. The label for the vaccine states that its
safety and effectiveness "in a post-exposure setting has not been established."
1 17
Thus, its use for this purpose was, as a technical matter, off-label and not
investigational. As discussed above, off-label use of approved drugs is viewed as a
legitimate and often indispensible part of ordinary medical practice. While the
Byrd Amendment, addressed below, prohibits off-label administration to military
personnel without consent, no similar consent requirement is mandated for
civilians under either FDA regulations or tort law.
This critique by no means is meant to dismiss as illegitimate the safety
concerns that were raised about the anthrax vaccine - criticisms of the laxity with
which the vaccine's manufacturer approached its task as well as FDA's arguably
weak oversight have been discussed elsewhere." 8 However, it is meant to point
out that the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine should not be judged solely by
its regulatory status, nor should those who receive it be classified as human
subjects solely on this basis. That a district court could claim in 2003 that
administration of AVA constituted a "demand that members of the armed forces
114. John J. Michels, Jr., The Anthrax Vaccine Controversy, VA. LAWYER, Dec., 2001, at 20, 21,
http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/decO 1/michaels.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
115. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142 (2000); Hanson v. U.S., 417
F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn. 1976) ("the 'intended use' of a product, within the meaning of the Act, is
determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and any other
relevant source.").
116. See General Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs,
21 C.F.R. § 201.56(c) (2003).
117. FDA, supra note 113, at 3.
118. Gail H. Javitt, Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense: Refining FDA Regulation to
Promote the Availability of Products to Counter Biological Attacks, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 37, 82-93 (2002).
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also serve as guinea pigs for experimental drugs"" 9 not only reflects a
misunderstanding of the FDA approval process, but moreover serves as a red flag
that the current regulatory system insufficiently distinguishes between research and
treatment, thereby creating confusion, misunderstanding, and distrust among
civilians, military personnel, and even the judiciary.
This critique also should not be understood to downplay the particular care
that should be taken in evaluating the safety and effectiveness of products
administered to military personnel, whether investigational or approved. Military
personnel are unique in that they waive their right to consent to medical treatment
when they join the military, 120 and in general agree to submit to decisions by the
government about a wide variety of issues affecting their well-being.' 21 They also
differ from most civilians because a decision made by one soldier may impact the
well-being of other military personnel and the success of the military enterprise as
a whole. Because of their reduced autonomy to make personal decisions, military
personnel must rely on risk-benefit judgments made by others regarding all aspects
of their service, in particular with regard to the administration of therapeutic and
prophylactic products. Those tasked with such decisions should have adequate
expertise and should make such decisions only after careful review of the risks and
benefits involved. But this need for expertise and special care inheres regardless of
the regulatory status of the product. In all cases, the evidence of a product's safety
and effectiveness must be carefully reviewed, and those with adequate expertise
must determine that the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks. Such a
determination may be more challenging when dealing with an investigational
product if there is incomplete safety and effectiveness information, but the unique
status of military personnel demands particular care in all cases.
C. The Animal Efficacy Rule
More recent efforts by FDA to speed approval of products to counter
bioterrorism similarly demonstrate the need for a new paradigm, but for different
reasons. In 2002, FDA issued a final rule, commonly known as the "Animal
Efficacy Rule" (AER), which lowers the barriers to market entry of drugs and
biological products (including vaccines) by eliminating clinical data requirements
to demonstrate a product's efficacy. 22 The final rule permits the approval of
"appropriate studies in animals in certain cases to provide substantial evidence of
119. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119, 135 (D. D.C. 2003).
120. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 16 (discussing command aspects of military care).
121. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 978 (2000) (describing drug and alcohol abuse and dependency testing
for new entrants); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 16, Ch. 4 (outlining the standard for appearance and
choice of personal relationships).
122. New Drug and Biological Drug Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,988, 37,989 (May 31, 2002) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 & 601).
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the effectiveness of new drug and biological products used to reduce or prevent the
toxicity of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear substances."'' 23 Approval
on this basis is limited to situations where it would be unethical to conduct efficacy
studies in humans (because such studies would require exposure of healthy
subjects to lethal agents) and for "drug and biological products that are intended to
reduce or prevent serious or life-threatening conditions.' 24  The Rule does not
waive the requirement for clinical data on product safety.
125
A product approved pursuant to the AER is not considered to be
investigational. Because it is approved with less than the usual amount of data
required for drug approval, it is subject to additional requirements. These include
the need for postmarketing studies 126 and for specific patient labeling. 127 The
labeling
[M]ust explain that, for ethical or feasibility reasons, the drug's
approval was based on efficacy studies conducted in animals alone and
must give the drug's indication(s), directions for use (dosage and
administration), contraindications, a description of any reasonably
foreseeable risks, adverse reactions, anticipated benefits, drug
interactions, and any other relevant information required by FDA at the
time of approval.
28
The labeling must, if possible, be provided to patients prior to administration
or dispensing of the drug product.' 
29
PB was the first - and, to date, the only - product approved under the AER.
30
The AER was a significant and unprecedented departure from statutory
requirements for product approval - a departure on which there has been few
remarks. Section 505(d) of the FD&C Act precludes FDA approval of a new drug
application for which "there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.' 3' The
term substantial evidence is defined as:
[E]vidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations,
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
123. Id. at 37,988-89.
124. Id. at 37,989.
125. Id.
126. Approval of New Drugs When Human Efficacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.610(b)(1) (2004).
127. Id. § 314.610(b)(3).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. E-mail from Christopher Colwell, Policy Analyst, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to Gail
H. Javitt, Greenwall Fellow in Bioethics and Health Policy (2000-2002), Johns Hopkins and
Georgetown Universities (July 6, 2004, 10:27 EST) (on file with Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
131. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
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training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.
(emphasis added). 1
32
On its face, this definition requires clinical efficacy studies as a mandatory
component of new drug applications, and this is the manner in which the provision
had previously been interpreted, without exception. FDA, in the proposed rule,
acknowledged its deviation from the agency's longstanding interpretation of
substantial evidence but reasoned that the agency's prior regulations:
[D]id not contemplate situations in which efficacy studies cannot be
ethically conducted in humans, and FDA believes that it would be
inconsistent with the statute's public health objectives to conclude that
FDA cannot use some other basis for considering the efficacy of such
products. The legislative history does not address this issue.
Concluding that such products cannot ever be approved because human
efficacy trials cannot be conducted is contrary to the public interest and
inconsistent with the act's purpose of public health protection. Courts
have recognized that remedial statutes such as the act are to be liberally
construed consistent with the act's overriding purpose to protect the
public health.1
33
In addition, FDA drew a link between investigational and approved products
in supporting its decision:
This conclusion is consistent with the recognition by Congress of the
importance of ethical behavior in the study of unapproved products. For
example, Congress has acknowledged the need: (1) [flor informed
consent in clinical research (section 505(i)(2) of the act); (2) to have due
regard for patients in issuing regulations for investigational use of drugs
(section 505(k) of the act); and (3) for experts to act "fairly and
responsibly" in evaluating efficacy (section 505(d) of the act). Where
human efficacy trials cannot be done ethically, experts are without
human studies upon which to fairly and responsibly conclude that a
product is effective. In the situations described previously, the agency
believes that adequate and well-controlled animal studies may provide
sufficient data to warrant approval. 1
34
FDA noted in the preamble to its final rule that it received no comments
"discussing our legal authority to approve new drugs and biological products based
132. Id.
133. New Drug and Biological Drug Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,960, 53,964 (Oct. 5, 1999) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pis 314 & 601) (citing United States v. An Article of Drug * * * Bacto-Unidisk,
394 U.S. 784 (1968)).
134. Id.
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on evidence of effectiveness from studies in animals."' 135  Perhaps because the
AER was viewed as indispensable to providing products to counter bioterrorism,
not one comment raised the question of whether FDA had exceeded the scope of
its statutory authority, and therefore acted unlawfully, when it promulgated the
AER.
136
The question of whether FDA exceeded its lawful authority in promulgating
the AER was also perhaps mooted by Congress' explicit direction to the agency to
finalize the rule -which had been pending in a proposed state from 1999 to 2002.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of
200213' directed FDA to complete the process of rulemaking within 90 days of the
statute's enactment. 38 But the 2002 Act did not amend the FD&C Act definition of
substantial evidence, nor did it legislatively codify FDA's interpretation of this
definition. Thus, the question of the legality of the AER, however academic, still
stands.
Of more practical import, the AER demonstrates the degree to which FDA
has stretched its own statutory authority in the service of approving products for
emergent circumstances. Such products may in fact be no more (and may even be
less) supported by safety and efficacy data than are products under an IND. This is
because an IND product is investigational from the phase I safety trial through the
phase III clinical efficacy study, until the actual moment of approval. This is a
135. New Drug and Biological Drug Products, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,993.
136. It might have been argued, for example, that the "plain meaning" of the statute required human
clinical data of efficacy to support FDA approval. If a court agreed that the meaning of the statute was
clear, it would likely hold FDA's action unlawful. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (noting that "if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress"). If, however, a court determined that the language was ambiguous, it would generally
accord significant deference to a reasonable agency interpretation. Id. at 843. In this case, a court
would also likely note the agency's departure from longstanding policy, and review whether such a
change was adequately explained. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) ("An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or
without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis...." (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
Courts accord less deference to an interpretation that constitutes an unexplained departure from a prior
consistently held view of the agency. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); Good
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 57.
137. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
138. Id. at § 123. This section stated that:
[n]ot later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall complete the process of rulemaking that was commenced under
authority of section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act with the issuance of the proposed rule entitled "New Drug
and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed to Demonstrate Efficacy of New Drugs
for Use Against Lethal or Permanently Disabling Toxic Substances When Efficacy
Studies in Humans Ethically Cannot be Conducted" published in the Federal Register on
October 5, 1999 (64 Fed. Reg. 53,960), and shall promulgate a final rule.
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wide continuum that encompasses a broad range of information concerning
product safety and efficacy. Products approved under the animal efficacy rule and
IND products administered for therapeutic purposes therefore share substantive
similarities but are, as a regulatory matter, sharply divided. In some cases
recipients may be similarly vulnerable to harm. Yet the recipients of products in
the former category are considered "patients" while those receiving products in the
latter category are "human subjects." Both require similar regulatory protections
and disclosures. While neither should be viewed as "guinea pigs," heightened
safeguards are needed for both to ensure they are fully aware and informed of the
risks, limitations, and benefits of the products they are receiving. Additionally,
there is a need to monitor those receiving both types of products and for a
mechanism to gather retrospective data on their outcomes. Regardless of the
regulatory status, and regardless of whether the recipients are civilian or military,
data to assess whether the product was protective or therapeutic, or alternatively
whether it caused harm, is needed.
D. Project Bioshield and the Emergency Use Authorization Provision
Following the first Gulf War, researchers expected that FDA would finalize
its Interim Rule, but the agency did not do so. The Presidential Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, which operated from 1995-1997,
recommended that FDA complete the rulemaking process it had begun.' 39  In
response, FDA published a request for comments on the merits of finalizing,
modifying, or revoking the Interim Rule. 140  The overwhelming majority of
comments FDA received opposed the interim rule and argued that informed
consent is essential for military personnel.
14
'
139. See generally PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES,
FINAL REPORT, ch. 2 (1996), http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/gwvi/ch2.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
140. Accessibility to New Drugs for Use in Military and Civilian Exigencies When Traditional
Human Efficacy Studies are Not Feasible, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,996 (July 31, 1997) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 50) (request for comments).
141. Human Drugs and Biologics, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,181. According to FDA, the agency received
134 comments on whether it should revoke or amend the Interim Rule, 119 of which opposed the rule
and recommended revocation:
Most of these comments opposed the agency's continued use of the interim rule after the
experience of the Persian Gulf War. Many thought it should never have been used.
Specifically, 114 comments stated that informed consent was absolutely essential and that
military personnel, like other nonmilitary citizens, should receive adequate information
about an investigational product before its use and have the right to refuse to receive it.
Seventeen comments stressed the need for followup of possible adverse reactions to
investigational products, and 15 comments indicated that DOD could not fulfill its
responsibilities even if FDA required adequate followup and other requirements as part of
a new regulation. Five comments stated that DOD had shown itself to be incapable of
adequate oversight and recordkeeping and three comments noted that the interim rule had
not been implemented by DOD as had been intended. Several comments suggested that if
the rule were to be used again, there must be an independent board of medical and ethical
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Legislation adopted in October 1998 effectively mooted the issue. Known as
the Byrd Amendment, the legislation vested the authority to grant waivers of
informed consent for the use of an IND product, as well as for a "product
unapproved for its applied use" (i.e., off-label use), solely in the President of the
United States, based on criteria to be established by FDA. 142 Thereafter, FDA
formally revoked the Interim Rule and issued the criteria to be used by the
President in reviewing waiver requests. 143
Since the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, there have been no requests to
waive consent. The result of the Amendment has been to prevent DOD, as a
practical matter, from using IND products or off-label products for force
protection. 144 Critics of the Gulf War episode support this outcome as providing
necessary human rights protections to troops. 145 However, this outcome also may
have limited DOD's choices in protecting troops from potential threats. In the case
of off-label use of drugs, moreover, it has given DOD less latitude in treating its
own troops than physicians have in the course of their ordinary medical practice.1
4 6
Project Bioshield, which passed 99-0 in the Senate in May 200414' and, in a
different version in the House in July 2003,148 contains a provision aimed at
experts, there must be an institutional review board independent of DOD, and there must
be proper monitoring that could only be done by non-DOD personnel.
Id.
142. 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000).
143. FDA issued an Interim Final Rule describing these criteria in 1999. See Human Drugs and
Biologics, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,181. More recently, the agency announced its intention to issue a final
rule by July 2002. See Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 67 Fed. Reg.
33,039, 33,043 (May 13, 2002) (semiannual regulatory agenda).
144. RETTIG, supra note 1, at 15; see also DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE - USE OF
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS FOR FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION 3 (2000), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf2/d62002p.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
145. See generally George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55
FLA. L. REV. 1171 (2003) (arguing that forced medical treatment and immunizations are
unconstitutional); Philip Alcabes & Ann B. Williams, Human Rights and the Ethic of Care: A
Framework for Health Research and Practice, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 229 (2002)
(discussing potential risks and benefits for clinical research in human rights context).
146. Off-label use is recognized as a legitimate, and often indispensable, part of medical practice.
See Beck & Azari, supra note 74, at 76-80.
147. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, S. 15, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_congbills&docid=f:s 15es.txt.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
148. Project Bioshield Act of 2003, H.R. 2122, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108 cong bills&docid=f:h2I22ih.txt.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005). The full House approved its version of Project Bioshield on July 16, 2003.
"The largest difference between the bills is how each would fund the purchase of countermeasures. S.
15 authorizes and appropriates for each fiscal year in perpetuity 'such sums as may be necessary' to
procure countermeasures. This mandatory funding is not subject to the annual appropriations process.
In contrast, H.R. 2122 does not appropriate any money, but establishes a special fund for the purchase
of countermeasures and authorizes the appropriation of up to $5.593 billion total for the fiscal years
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facilitating the administration of unapproved and off-label products to both
military personnel and civilians in the event of a national security emergency
stemming from biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear agents. 49 Bioshield
empowers the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize the emergency
use - defined in statute as "intended for use in an actual or potential emergency'
'150
- of medical products that have not yet been approved by FDA or that have been
approved for a different indication. Such an authorization may be made upon
declaration of emergency by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, which in
turn must be based on a determination by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security that "there is a domestic emergency, or a
significant potential for a domestic emergency, involving a heightened risk of
attack with a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or
agents; '"'i 5 or, authorization my be made upon a determination by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services of a "public health emergency under section 319 of the
Public Health Service Act that affects, or has a significant potential to affect,
national security, and that involves a specified biological, chemical, radiological,
or nuclear agent or agents, or a specified disease or condition that may be
attributable to such agent or agents.' 52
To exercise this authority, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must
conclude, preferably after consultation with the Director of the National Institutes
of Health and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, that:
(1) the agent for which the countermeasure is designed can cause
serious or life-threatening disease; (2) the product may reasonably be
believed to be effective in detecting, diagnosing, treating, or preventing
the disease; (3) the known and potential benefits of the product
outweigh its known and potential risks; (4) there is no adequate
alternative to the product that is approved and available; and (5) any
other criteria prescribed in regulation are met. 153
Emergency use authorization must be product specific and time limited,
lasting no more than one year.' 54 The law specifies that, "to the extent practicable,"
information must be provided to health professionals and recipients about the
known risks, benefits, and alternatives, if any, of the product; that recipients must
2004 to 2013." FRANK GOTTRON, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, PROJECT BIOSHIELD 2 (2003),
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21507.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
149. S. 15. Most of the Act addresses the creation of incentives to encourage the pharmaceutical
industry to research and develop bioterrorism countermeasures. Id. The Act authorizes a 10-year, S6
billion plan under which the government would create and produce vaccines and treatments for anthrax,
Ebola, the plague and other potential bio-terrorism agents. Id.
150. Id. § 4(a).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. GOTTRON, supra note 148, at 4.
154. S. 15,§4.
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be informed of their option to refuse treatment and the consequences of such
refusal; and that adverse event monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping occur.
155
Bioshield reflects a legislative attempt to work around the problems of
administering IND and off-label products to civilians. It creates a mechanism for
civilians analogous to the Byrd Amendment's provisions for military personnel.
While it is too soon to assess its effectiveness in achieving its objectives, and while
its implementation will require careful and thoughtful drafting of regulations, the
manner in which the legislation is designed raises some potential concerns. First,
given the history of neglect of the Byrd Amendment, it is unclear whether the IND
authorization will have any practical effect. In practice, the hurdles to be
overcome may be too great. Second, the statute gives no practical guidance on
what constitutes an emergency, or what criteria are to be used to determine
whether an emergency exists. Indeed, the precise point at which an emergency is
upon us, or is likely enough to trigger the Bioshield provisions, is difficult to
define. In practice, there may be insufficient time to trigger these provisions, at
least in the thoughtful and deliberative way contemplated by the statute.
The inclusion of off-label uses in Bioshield, as it was in the Byrd
Amendment, is puzzling. As stated above, off-label use is an accepted part of
medical care. Thus, aligning it in these two statutes with IND uses imposes a much
higher burden on these products than they are ordinarily subject to. While there
may need to be a mechanism to permit physicians, manufacturers, and state and
federal public health agencies to endorse the use of a product for an unapproved
use, it is unclear why the standards for doing so should be the same as for a
product that has never been approved for any indication.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally given the premise of this paper,
Bioshield does not resolve the inherent regulatory mismatch that currently exists
when IND products are used for a therapeutic purpose. Bioshield thus uses the
same method for speeding up access that FDA has historically used: namely,
creating exceptions to the IND rules without changing the "investigational"
terminology. Bioshield therefore does nothing to alleviate, and will likely
perpetuate, the confusion that exists when unapproved drugs, or drugs for
unapproved uses, are used to combat emergent heath threats.
VI. AMENDING FDA REGULATIONS TO PERMIT LIMITED PURPOSE APPROVAL
One means to alleviate the confusion regarding unapproved drugs, and to
facilitate their use to combat emergent health threats while adequately protecting
recipients of these products, is to create a new category of drug approval. This
155. Id.
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new category, tentatively termed "limited purpose" or "interim" approval, could be
used for products about which insufficient data exist regarding safety and
effectiveness to warrant full, unrestricted approval, but for which it has been
determined that there is a reasonable basis to offer it to populations at high-risk
under specific conditions. Such products would not be regulated pursuant to
FDA's investigational new drug regulations. Nevertheless, they would be subject
to certain safeguards to ensure adequate monitoring of adverse events and adequate
provision of information to recipients concerning risks and benefits.
Manufacturers would also be required to conduct "Phase IV" or postmarketing
research to bolster the safety and effectiveness data. In addition, their approval
would be limited to specific populations or circumstances, depending on the
product at issue. Types of limited-purpose approval could be, for example, "For
Military Use Only," or "For Emergency Medical Personnel Only." Each approval
would therefore be carefully tailored to the situation for which its use was
contemplated. Furthermore, approval would be time-limited, after which FDA
would reevaluate the product in light of reported adverse events and additional data
gathered during the time the product was approved.
Under this proposed framework, manufacturers would have to prepare
adequate labeling to explain to both providers and patients the risks, limitations,
and potential benefits of the product, and the basis upon which it was approved.
FDA could help ensure adequate disclosure through the use of "patient package
inserts," which is a mechanism that FDA has previously used for certain types of
products where it is especially important to ensure that adequate information is
provided to the patient concerning a drug product.
As with other medical treatments, providers would be under a legal obligation
to inform patients of the risks and benefits of taking the products. However, unlike
products under an IND, the formal regulatory procedures associated with consent
would not be required.
VII. CONCLUSION
The philosopher George Santayana is credited with the now famous aphorism
that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. 156 But it is
equally the case, though perhaps less often appreciated, that those who draw the
wrong lessons from history may make new errors with unforeseen, but similarly
damaging, negative consequences.
When considering the issue of the use of investigational therapies in cases of
extreme threat - whether that threat is imposed from bioterror agents or "naturally"
156. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1927).
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originating threats such as SARS, it is important to be guided by history but not
misled by it. It is especially important that the atrocities of previous eras not be
misinterpreted to preclude the provision of potentially life-saving therapies to
military personnel or to the public under the misguided apprehension that such
conduct would violate human rights or constitute unethical human
experimentation. This is not to ignore the need for rigorous and exacting scientific
research and exquisite examination of the risks and benefits to potential recipients
of any product that purports to be therapeutic - whether fully "approved" or
"investigational." Nor should it ignore the need to inform the potential recipients
of a product of the risks and benefits of the product, to the extent they are known -
not because they are considered to be, as a formal legalistic matter, "subjects" of
an experiment, but because, as with all medical decisions, they must be adequately
informed to make rational choices tailored to their individual needs. But, in
considering these issues we should be guided by the facts before us, and the
realistic concerns that these facts raise, rather than informed by the specter of the
past and labels and categories that may no longer apply.
Of course, a more complex question arises when consent is viewed as
infeasible because an individual's choice not to accept a particular therapy has
implications for the safety and well-being of others. Some have debated whether
and under what circumstances civil liberties may be limited in the face of
bioterrorism. 157 Since the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts5 8 in the early 1900s,
courts have recognized that the government may in certain circumstances require
civilians to be vaccinated without their consent to avoid harms to others. Military
personnel in general waive their right to consent to standard medical treatment
when they enlist, 159 and medical treatment decisions are made not only with the
individuals' well-being in mind, but also with regard to benefit to the military as a
whole. Because of this, special safeguards should be in place to ensure that those
making the decisions regarding what treatments military personnel receive
appropriately consider the risks and benefits to troops and institute adequate
measures for monitoring and responding to adverse events. This is particularly
important when considering products with incomplete safety and effectiveness
information.
157. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003) (discussing
how far personal and economic liberties can be restricted to protect the public health); Annas, supra
note 145 (arguing that Americans should not tolerate a substantial loss of civil liberties to deal with
bioterrorism).
158. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a city ordinance requiring citizens to be vaccinated against
smallpox as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health and safety of its
citizens).
159. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 16.
2005]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
But the question of when, whether, and by whom consent is required should
be evaluated separately from the question of whether there is sufficient information
concerning a product's potential risks and benefits to warrant its administration for
therapeutic or prophylactic purposes. As to this latter question, the need to ensure
that benefits outweigh risks exists regardless of whether the product is, as a
regulatory matter, classified as "investigational" or "approved."
Unfortunately, the damaging combination of politics, bureaucratic arcana,
and inflammatory rhetoric has stymied efforts to clarify and resolve these issues.
The attempt by FDA and DOD in 1990 to provide investigational therapies to
military troops facing potential biological and chemical warfare threats was
superseded by Congress, an action which has resulted in the virtual inability to
provide investigational treatments in combat. It is too soon to judge the
effectiveness of the emergency use authorization provision in Bioshield, but it too
may miss the mark and prove ineffective in practice because it attempts to
circumvent the central dilemma rather than squarely address it, and does so in a
manner that may have significant practical barriers to its implementation.
This paper has argued for a new category of FDA product, the "interim
approval," or "limited purpose approval," to take into account emergent threats
stemming from both bioterrorism-mediated and "natural" health threats. Such a
system could enhance regulatory clarity and thereby improve public understanding
and public trust, while enabling the provision of products with therapeutic potential
to prevent or mitigate emergent health threats.
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